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Abstract* 
The author challenges the dualistic view of social, political and economic governance, 
where markets and hierarchies (i.e. the state and governments as agents) dominated the 
theoretical fields. This is also a problem of new outlook of economics. A classification 
method for analysing the “fundamental ways” in organising and governing human 
societies is developed and the authentic building blocks for a “third way” policy-making 
are found in the interests of individuals and their micro-organisations. No instruments of 
socio-political governance can dissociate themselves from patterns of behaviour where 
justice, solidarity, altruism, reciprocity, consensus, local networks, human capital or 
ethics play important roles. The demise of communism, the hardships of transition and 
the differences in the performance of capitalism can be explained by the particular 
involvement of the third social pillar into the working of state hierarchies and economic 
markets.  
 
The interaction of markets, hierarchies and institutions of culture; of organisations and 
individuals; and interdependencies between the future and the past—all these 
phenomena call for wider “endogenisation” of theories explaining modern social order, 
for further integration of social sciences and for a more varied portfolio of choices 
offered by political parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 This paper was originally presented at conference “The Future of the 3
rd
 Way”, 
University of Oxford, Rothermere American Institute and Europaeum. 
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1. Alternative Meanings of the “Third Way” 
 
Coming up with an alternative definition of a “Third Way” in practical politics and real economics, 
which has appeared and disappeared many times in human history, has always drifted between 
being an objective phenomenon and a speculation. Cynics may comment that a “third way” is 
simply a natural strategy of all outsiders in politics who avoid challenging the existing order of 
power by way of direct confrontation, instead offering an eclectic “third option” that would allow 
them to step in by side doors. We argue in this paper that this is a confused meaning of the “third 
way”.  
 Our first task is to define what we mean by “ways” and how the standard dual interpretation 
of “ways” can expand into a three-pronged choice of policies. Let us assume that the strategic set of 
ruling policies (political objectives and its instruments) is labelled as A and the opposition to them 
is labelled as B. If B is claiming that non-A is a better arrangement, then an emerging third party, 
who wants to win the political race alone, has a logical problem how to define its policies C, once 
the non-A is already occupied by a strong player. This problem has two levels of interpretation.  
First, we may say that the “third way” to politics is a mere variant of a marketing 
differentiation technique used on oligopolistic political markets. In this case, it is used for 
challenging an existing political duopoly, which is most probably well entrenched in their strategy 
of influencing the median voter. One may judge that if A is described by a vector with n policy 
instruments 
1
, then the set of all clear-cut policies (including the non-A) can be expanded to a 
combination of 2
n
 programs (“ways”). Thus if the set of strategic policies has just one nominal 
element (for example, a referendum if there should or should not be a monarchy and the power 
struggle is between royalists and republicans), then no third party is in a position to advance a very 
original alternative. There must be a second strategic element (for example, a democracy) 
introduced that would create a niche for a third (and even a fourth) party offering an original 
programme 
2
.  
Of course, if there are too many policy instruments in the vector of political programmes, 
the number of niches for party differentiation rises exponentially. However, at the same time, the 
political appeal of these parties downgrades proportionally. At this level of interpretation, the 
alternative policy proposals are viewed as a mere different combination (or dosage) of existing 
standard policies, which are in their substance subjective. They depend too much on the 
personalities who claim it. The “third ways” and their political credibility as a “new way” dissipate 
if the devil is merely in the details. The weakness of political programmes aspiring to be an 
alternative to standard bipartisan power struggle rests in its subjectivism. It is a mere promissory 
declaration for attracting an attention of the electorate by using a differentiated slogan.  
The subjective definition of the “third way” can be contrasted by a definition based on 
objective criteria. What matters here is the exogenous ontological nature of the third alternative. For 
example, it can be associated with emerging new objective processes changing the present social 
order and its existing bi-polar constituency of interests. It is not a mere aberration of existing 
politics. We may call it a political break-through at the level of such fundamentals as the wealth and 
the power. 
 
                                                 
1
 The best reference is the modelling technique of Jan Tinbergen (1952 and 1956), where a 
“policy” set is characterized by variables describing the present and the past state of exogenous 
fundamentals, their effects on the economy, policy instruments and a criterion (based on 
endogenous “target variables”) for assessing policy alternatives.  
2
 These can be mutually exclusive programmes for constitutional monarchy, autocratic monarchy, 
republican democracy or republican dictatorship. In Germany in 1933 the nationalistic alternative 
offered by A. Hitler can be classified as a third way – a non-democratic alternative to the power 
struggle between traditional democratic right and democratic left.  
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This problem has also deep roots in the economic literature and philosophy. Hayek (1973) 
came up with a supposition that all functioning economic systems must be based on a concept of 
“order”. He distinguished two sources of order: Cosmos and Taxis. The former is given 
exogenously (i.e. spontaneously) and is represented, among others, by technologies, factor 
endowments, free markets, informal rules and behavioural patterns. The latter is created 
artificially, reflecting the aims (i.e. the vested interests) of certain social groups. Taxis is 
represented by organizations, their hierarchies and institutions. Hayek claims that it is impossible 
to introduce a new order by force - just by manipulating Taxis. We can use Hayek’s reasoning and 
argue that our first interpretation of the “third way” is an attempt to introduce a new political 
order by merely reorganizing Taxis, while Cosmos was unchanged. Our second interpretation is 
based on changing politics in response to changes in Cosmos, while the two incumbent opposing 
political structures did not reflect the change. 
 
The strength of the third way is magnified if it comes up with a non-orthodox alternative 
to existing fundamental policy variables upon which the present institutional superstructure 
was built. Such a superstructure is subject to a typical institutional inertia, even though previous 
fundamentals have lost the reason for existence. We are entering the ground of historical breaks and 
their institutional shakeouts. What kind of variables might these be? We are dealing with politics – 
i.e. with the ways of determining social governance related to hierarchies of social organisation 
and their decision-making. Politics of break-through is therefore addressing not only certain vested 
interests but also the basic principles of their functionality.  
In the European history the functionality of social governance was long dominated by a 
duality of hierarchies: that of the Church and that of the Sovereign. Both were associated with the 
tenure of land. As was best described by A. Smith, D. Ricardo and later by K. Marx, a mighty third 
power emerged at the end of 18
th
 century: that of capital and markets. The dualism of previous 
hierarchies became obsolete and was gradually replaced by a single hierarchy of the secular state. 
As capitalism matured, a new dualism was established: that of markets and private property rights 
on one hand and that of the state hierarchies and redistributions on the other.  
Marx, however, made an unexpected move in an attempt to outwit both Ricardo and the 
reality by denying the legitimacy of the new political duality. He disclaimed unilaterally the 
viability of both markets and states, declaring a very politically attractive third way: that of a final 
expropriation, common ownership and the nirvana of communism. Taken from the hindsight of the 
history, the latter was a visionary utopia, which more pragmatic Lenin and Stalin returned later 
back to a model akin most to the feudal duality by superseding the Church by the Communist Party 
and the Sovereign by the autocratic state bureaucracy. In parallel, Mussolini and Hitler also pushed 
social organisation in a similar direction – towards the hierarchies. Throughout 1920-1990 the 
world became split between two mutually antagonistic “ways” – that of the market and that of the 
central command. The split was also manifested in the ideology of capitalism and socialism, and 
backed by opposing military powers. At this moment we are ready to turn our attention to the 
polemics about the purity of economic fundamentals that created this social split.  
The development of capitalist market economies was accompanied by an emergence of 
theoretical reasoning claiming that the State (or any similar hierarchy) should be nearly completely 
discarded. The ideology of laisser-faire was brought to an astonishing perfection in the models of 
general competitive equilibrium by Walras, Arrow and Debreu (see Weintraub, 1983). 
Nevertheless, as a response, the model of perfect markets was soon challenged by models of 
imperfect competition published in 1933 by Chamberlin and Robinson (see Hart, 1985). At the 
same time, the reality of Big Crash (1929-1934) and further empirical studies of industrial 
organisation confirmed that a convergence towards perfect competition was not a natural state of 
affairs and that oligopolistic markets or market imperfections pervaded. The role of the State was 
steadily increasing throughout 20
th
 century, as could be measured by the share of taxes or 
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government expenditure on GDP. In the 1980s, in some Scandinavian countries and in all countries 
of “real socialism”, the tax quota appropriated more than 50% of GDP. The theory of second best 
was an attempt to reconcile the orthodox neoclassical economics with empirics.  
 
2. The Theory of Second Best and Constrained Optimality of Real Social Systems 
 
According to the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), absolutely perfect markets 
lead to Pareto optimum and assure the unrivalled most efficient usage of resources. In contrast, 
distortions of the market cause deadweight losses and less efficient outcomes, as is shown by 
stylized facts in Figure 1. The policies of laisser faire should then strive to bring the economy to a 
state A with zero distortions. But is it ever possible?  
 
Efficiency index   
(level of Pareto sub-optimality based on market pricing) 
 
 
 
             “liberal” 
              socialist 
 
         
           communist 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                  F        G 
        0 
          A           B       C           D       E                       
Figure 1: Theory of second best and fluctuating decline of efficiency with increasing 
market distortions 
 
There are several problems in comparing alternative states of the markets:  
 
a) The intensity of “market distortions” can be defined only by a vector. Therefore the sequencing 
and ranking of distortions is not unique. 
b) The comparison of efficiency on the vertical axis in cases of many non-homogenous products 
cannot avoid using prices and exchange rates. But these must be based on free trading, 
otherwise the prices are distorted. Thus closed economies with distorted markets have a 
tendency of developing a large gap between the GDP per capita based on commercial values 
and GDP per capita based on subjective estimations of purchasing power parity. 
c) A change in distortion is not always linearly and monotonously associated with a change in 
efficiency. There can be unexpected local maxima and minima. The politics may prefer to 
guard their local maxima only (see points C, E, F and G).  
d) The transaction costs of moving to perfect markets may be so large that moving from point C 
(“neoliberal” arrangement) or E (socialist arrangement) towards A would be both economically 
untenable because of the negative slope in segments to the left from local maxima. The policy 
Level of market distortions 
● 
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of social democrats based on market interventions, regulation and public property in E could be 
therefore vindicated because a transition from E to C may end up in D, which is a worse 
position than in E or even F. 
e) If the economic optimum in A is not a state of self-sustaining natural equilibrium, it must be 
man-contrived and thus dominated by some hierarchy, what implies transaction costs and 
distortions. Point A is therefore unattainable in reality. 
f) Economic optimum in A must be therefore different from potential social equilibria (e.g. in C 
or E) and therefore it is dominated by social governance. 
  
The problem with this approach to neoclassical market fundamentalism rests in its tacit 
assumption that there are only private goods produced and that non-linearities are caused by 
behavioural irregularities in the process of incremental changes in the level of market distortions. 
Unfortunately there are various externalities to private activities. Keynes (1936) was among the first 
who claimed that free markets could be hit by low expectations and the resources need not be fully 
employed. State interventions on the side of aggregate demand may be therefore rational. Then 
Coase (1937) added that even though markets are the most efficient instruments for trading, 
production requires an organisation inside of firms that is based on hierarchies. Naturally, the 
growth of firms towards world monopolies crowds out the markets. Already Marx was aware of this 
phenomenon and it inspired him and his followers that the whole society should be thus organised 
like a big firm. Finally Schumpeter (1947) proposed a reverted explanation why the rule of the 
markets is not an exclusive way the politicians should follow. The mere combination of market 
efficiency and growing scale economies will finally weaken the markets since monopolists, 
technocrats and bureaucrats will finally dominate the economy, becoming the closest allies to 
politicians.  
Although the definition of point A is extremely important as an academic concept, mixing 
it with reality and real policies is a normative illusion of human engineering. Any interest at 
bringing the reality to state A would require a forceful disruption of the socio-economic order 
where many alleged “distortions” are its naturally developed parameters sine qua non. The 
transaction costs for eliminating them might be higher than the gains in efficiency. Markets do not 
have a built-in tendency of converging automatically to a state of perfect competition. In reality, we 
even observe an opposite natural tendency – towards imperfect markets and visible hands ruling on 
them. Market distortions are not caused only by regulations of the government – there are also 
regulations and collusions coming from other sources of power.  
Let us now turn our attention at the central command (as the potential alternative to 
markets), at the controversies between markets and central planning, and at their impacts on a 
search for the third way. Analogically to Figure 1, we can apply the theory of second best on the 
pure system of central command. We could argue that, hypothetically, the command system could 
perform best in a completely collectivised system where subsistence consumption and high 
investments would lead to the highest growth on a von Neumann optimal path.  
How is it with the reality? Although the idea of technologically based central planning 
could have been acceptable during the World War II, an economy at peace had to yield to the 
pressures from the civil sector, i.e. from the interests of individuals and their need for personal 
freedom and initiative. That implies negotiating, auctioning, ranking by voting and a resurrection of 
markets. Therefore markets, along with hierarchies, remain an intrinsic factor in both real systems, 
even though their combination is not subject to random rules. 
For example, the controversies after the War Communism (1918-22) in the Soviet Union 
(Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1969) and their final solution by Stalin re-introducing the central 
command, assumed that money (as a symbol of markets) as a means of exchange will cease to exist, 
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and production and consumption could be provided “scientifically” from the centre 
3
. The 
assumption of objectivity in determining the structure of demand was a completely different 
theoretical principle than was the principle of a subjective theory of value and marginal utility, as 
explained by market economics. The systems based on planning and on markets differed in one 
additional aspect: the former was dependent on collectivism and the latter on individualism. 
Therefore both the objectives and the institutions in both systems must have developed differently.  
Stalin was obliged from the start to make a concession by accepting that money should be 
retained in order to have an anchor of hard budget constraint effective at least in the area of 
transactions of households. That was a concession accepting the existence of individualism in tastes 
for consumption and of inequality in the productive performance of individuals. Also the firms were 
linked to the state budget by money, though used only as accounting units. These “distortions” of 
the purity of planning command had to be accepted also here on grounds of objective reasons, 
similarly like it happened with the real market economies, where the state hierarchy was retained. 
Guided again by strong academic assumptions, we could redraw Figure 1 also for the pure 
command system and discuss its tractability. By combining the graphs of second best for both 
alternative systems we arrive at the hypothetical relationship between them as is presented in Figure 
2.  
   
     GDP per capita in purchasing parities (on both vertical axes) 
 
  M               
     Market economies     Command economies 
 
                                    M’ 
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   T                        
       B 
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                 Distortion of the system 
 
 Figure 2: Trade-offs between markets and hierarchies 
 
 We interpret the shaded stripe as a smooth quadratic envelope for the fluctuating efficiency 
indicator. If the search for optimum is constrained by transaction costs, imperfect information and 
short-run expectations of decision-makers, then rationality becomes bounded and the quest for an 
optimum is terminated if the solution is “satisficing” (Simon, 1947). For example, although the 
                                                 
3
 For example, production can be managed by mere optimal technological requirements, as was 
modelled by the input-output tables and consumption of households can be subject to scientifically 
prescribed dietary and housing norms. The war economy and the military command supported the 
sustainability of such arrangements by empirical evidence. 
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global maxima 
4
 are in M and M’, points E and E’ may be compatible with local maxima, pointing 
to arrangements to which the real system might converge and where the eclectic combination of 
both markets and hierarchies is sustainable. Appeals for returning back to systemic purity in M or 
M’, called for by market or planning fundamentalists, would not be compatible with real politics. 
For example, a social experiment with abandoning all government regulation and transfers in any 
contemporary economy would end up in a state of intolerable uncertainty, risks of anarchy and a 
burden of social costs that would be vetoed by vested interests entrenched in politics. Also a call for 
an alleged “third way” propagating a heavily mixed economy in B would have little chance for 
success because such arrangement offers no guarantee for efficiency either.  
Figure 2 can be also interpreted as a path for “transition from planning to markets”, i.e. 
from R’ to R, which must result in a fall of GDP until the build-up of market institutions is not 
prevailing over the legacy of direct command. There could be an uncertainty here, too, as the whole 
process can run out of steam and get stuck in inefficient local maxima T’ or T’’, a situation 
illustrated by the cases of Belarus or Czechia in 1996. 
 A dramatic change occurred in the 1950s when the successful post-war recovery in 
democratic (market) economies led to the idea of welfare state. The affluence of material things and 
social peace in the West was a great challenge to planned economies, which were able neither to 
solve the supply shortage nor bring the quality of products to internationally competitive standards. 
On the other hand, planned economies could concentrate on some partial targets whose growth 
impressed many superficial observers. The quantity of steel, cement, electricity, heavy trucks and 
weapons per capita reached the top of world statistics. Surprisingly, the success was also evident in 
some more technical branches, like in the cosmic, nuclear and sports programmes.  
 If we compared the performance of these two basic social systems (as we tried in Figure 2) 
we might find that the objectives they followed diverged so significantly that a simple comparison 
would not be impossible. The alleged GDPs per capita (necessarily adjusted to non-market 
purchasing parities), which served for their comparison, were products emerging from virtually 
different demands. While the market economies satisfied the subjective demand of individuals, the 
planned economies satisfied the (subjective) demand of top hierarchies. Granted this inconsistency, 
both systems could be assumed to be efficient in their functioning sui generis. The problem of the 
latter was that once the hierarchy without Stalin /or Mao/ became less authoritative and the choices 
of individuals had to be granted certain autonomy, the criteria turned in favour of the market system 
and the planning system commenced to falter in both its aims and its means.  
 In the early 1960s Tinbergen (1961), a supporter of indicative planning of the market 
economies, came with a message that both systems might improve if they borrow the better parts of 
the alternative system. His idea of “convergence” received a wide support on both sides of the 
warring camps. Galbraith (1967) proposed to level the unequal distribution of riches through more 
powerful public domain and he envisaged an end to the perfect market economy due to the rise of a 
“new industrial state” dominated by hierarchies. The “third ways” proposed in the 1960s looked 
like a combination of the previous two prevailing systems, but they were based on an analysis of 
deep changes that the Western societies were undergoing.  
 Similar attempts of finding a changeover to a third way occurred in the Communist 
countries. The discussion was initiated by ideas of Lerner (1937) and Lange (1937) about 
simulations of markets and competition by the planning mechanism itself. The advances in 
optimisation algorithms of operations research (Dantzig-Wolfe, Kornai-Liptak and many others) 
and in computer technologies supported such schemes – see Malinvaud and Bacharach (1965) or 
Koopmans (1993) for an overview.  
                                                 
4
 One should resign from comparing the utility differential between M and M’. The objective 
functions of these two incongruous systems are so different (e.g. maximal consumption versus 
maximal military build-up) that neither the resultant numeraire of the GDP per capita nor the “lists 
of achievements” offer a sound base for global ranking.  
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During 1970s and 1980s, there were extensive academic discussions of “optimal planning” 
by the Soviet followers of L. V. Kantorovich and V. V. Novozhilov, where enterprises were 
supposed to compete in bidding to fulfil production targets announced by the central authority, not 
dissimilar to modern public procurement schemes. Thus prices could get an economic meaning, 
what would allow the minimisation of costs or maximisation of profits to replace the decisions of 
planning bureaucrats. In 1968 Czechoslovakia and Hungary started implementing a new type of 
economic reforms, called “third way”, reconciling state ownership with markets and local 
initiatives. That brought them closer to the already existing Yugoslav model or to the more general 
model of labour-managed firms (Vanek, 1970), where the collective governance of employed 
stakeholders (workers or managers) acted independently from investors, be it the State or private 
investors.  
Collective choice dilemmas, lack of accountability for losses, undercapitalization, incentive 
to wage overshooting and underemployment, problems with ownership transfers and inflexibility in 
restructuring made firms with closer worker-control still less competitive internationally than firms 
under the control of private investors (Dow, 2003). The Darwinian selection turned the odds against 
them in the long-run whenever they were faced by a direct market confrontation with an authentic 
private sector or even with a centrally-planned economic system. It is clear then that economies 
with firms under the dominance of labour operate in the field of opaque markets, unstable 
governance, risk of defaults, and reliance on State interventions. In Figure 2 we should locate them 
somewhere into the middle of the graph where the economic efficiency is low
5
.  
The assumed convergence between the market and the hierarchical systems, as conceived 
by Tinbergen, did not take place. The swing of the pendulum to neoliberal policies in the 1970s and 
1980s had wide repercussions throughout all market economies and the reforms in all European 
planned economies failed. The wishful thinking in redefining our Figure 2 from convex into 
concave, where the minimum of the shaded envelope at C would elevate to become a maximum, 
did not materialize. The search for a sustainable “third road” failed throughout the period 1956-
1989. There were no real economic forces that would support a hypothesis that a balanced 
combination of markets and planning could lead to both stable and efficient systems. This would 
mean that such a system had a potential for a positive synergy. History has shown that highly 
amalgamated (mixed) economies in the West were relatively inefficient (e.g. the Swedish model or 
the “welfare state” model in general). It was even worse with the East European promiscuous social 
systems based on “market socialism” that complemented inefficiency with instability.  
We can formulate the following conclusion: if the dominance of one pillar in a naturally 
developed social system (marked by local equilibrium) becomes crowded-out by a policy-induced 
expansion of the second pillar, then its synergy becomes negative and the resultant mixed system 
becomes unstable until certain critical mass of changes is not able to anchor it in a system 
dominated by the other pillar. The reason for this is that both the objectives and the means of a 
“forcefully converging” system are not compatible with the preferences of its society (i.e. the social 
equilibrium). The society is hurt by mounting internal conflicts, clashes over the economic and 
social governance, uncertainties with ownership and its productive collective actions become 
paralysed by rent-seeking strategies. 
The idea that societies cannot be built exclusively on one-pillar systems is crucial for our 
argument. We will consider its pros and cons in more detail here. Let us formulate a hypothetical 
conservative manifesto that (under the impressions from falling domino of communist societies) 
inspired many social observers in the early 1990s: “The episodes of central planning were just a 
blind alley of the human history. It is the market principle alone, which will remain the unhampered 
                                                 
5
 It is not without irony that an attempt at creating an instant capitalism by mass privatisation, for 
example by vouchers, employee or managerial buy-outs and loans without capital hedging, run into 
similar problems at a time where the access to an authentic private ownership was just around the 
corner (Mejstrik et al., 1997, ). 
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pillar underpinning economic development and the structure of politics after the fall of 
communism”. We will have to discuss the issue for transition economies and advanced market 
economies separately. 
 
3. The Untenability of One-Pillar Social Systems: From Command to Market 
  
If we look at the pillar of the government, the Communist countries relied heavily on the centralised 
hierarchies and the dominance of upper nomenclature (party “apparatchiks”) over the members at 
the executive levels of hierarchy (e.g. over the authentic economic agents in enterprises). At the 
same time there was an informal network formed at the grassroots that was based on direct 
interaction that was non-hierarchical. The result was a sort of imperfect social interaction that, by 
means of compromises, aimed at reaching a sort of a sustainable local optimum where neither the 
central command alone, nor the quasi-market bargaining over the “plan” could explain the 
functioning of such systems.  
In transition economies the growth of the private sector became the central political issue. 
Politicians interpreted it as a problem of a speedy privatisation. Thus the majority of these societies 
became obsessed by mass redistributions of equity shares in state firms (Ellerman, 2001, Benacek, 
2001). At the same time it was politically not accepted that the creation of the private property and 
private entrepreneurship could grow alternatively from the grass roots (Kornai (1989, 2000) and 
Sato (1995, 2000)). Such alternative would offer lesser space for redistributions of existing capital 
and windfall rents associated with them.   
The majority of early reforms in transition economies were marked by the belief in 
unfettered markets that would not only lead infallibly to high growth but also that these markets 
were self-contrived and self-enforcing entities. According to the principles of neoclassical 
economics embodied in the “Washington Consensus”, privatisation of (antiquated and inefficiently 
allocated) physical assets, liberalisation of trade and prudent macroeconomic policies would lead 
the transition economies automatically to growth.  
The actual developments in transition economies, in direct contrast to that, followed the 
path of unprecedented economic slump, stagnation and slow growth for many years. Out of 
nineteen countries undergoing transition in Europe, only three (Poland, Slovenia and perhaps 
Eastern Germany) were able to recover the output recorded in 1989 after 10 years of changes. We 
could gather that the build-up of the market environment was much slower than expected because 
otherwise we could not explain why the gains in efficiency were so small. For example, in Figure 2 
we could depict that the actual transitions reached the critical level of depression in C during 
approximately 2 years after its start in point E’. But it took the most successful transition economies 
another 7 years to reach the state of high distortions approximately at E’’, instead of ending in the 
ideal arrangement of M or in the more realistic point E, closing thus the end of transition in mere 5 
years altogether, as many analysts presumed.  
 After 1996 the approach to transition, guided by a couple of simple macroeconomic 
imperatives of the Washington Consensus, was slowly fading away and an approach based on 
institutional economics (e.g. Stiglitz, 1995, Olson and Kahkonen, 2000) gained grounds. These two 
moves had far-reaching consequences not only for the policies of transition but also for the re-
shaping of modern economics, social governance and the re-invention of public policies. Discarding 
of the Washington Consensus gave the crawling revolution of new economics a very important 
impetus because it finally broke the clasp that neoliberal economics had on human development. 
Actually it allowed the re-shaping of the paradigm of economics and diverted it from the legacy of 
neo-classical auto-regulation to the fields, which stressed the role of embedded institutions.  
Economic transition was originally viewed by many as a final empirical proof that 
hierarchies, planning and all sorts of “human engineering" were detrimental to economic 
development. It was assumed that the demise of central planning implied an existential negation of 
the principles of hierarchy as objective categories relevant for social governance. Then it would 
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follow that it was only the markets that retained an exclusive right to existence. The series of 
neoliberal/neo-conservative economic programmes, implemented in many post-communist 
countries after 1989, did not bring the ideologically anticipated outcomes. Surprisingly at the end, 
when the Washington Consensus lost ground, it turned out that the contrary was true and that it was 
some of the institutional anchors of neoclassical economics that failed in underpinning the 
emerging markets.  
The hypothesis that the development of markets was self-enforcing was refuted by factual 
outcomes when some of the markets in transition economies collapsed. One of the most 
ostentatious examples was the Czech capital market, which was designed to become a showroom of 
new emerging neoliberal capitalism. Out of over 1750 equity shares and securities that were traded 
on Czech capital market after the mass privatisation in 1992-94, less than a dozen could be 
considered tradable (see Blaha, 1994). The prices of the rest did not contain any objective economic 
information because traders and speculators were able to influence their value and turn the price 
losses on outsiders. The value of the assets was not derived from expected productivities but from 
hidden asset-stripping activities (Ellerman, 2001).  
The hypotheses that stock prices are market-clearing, that demand generates supply or that 
arbitrage can establish just one equilibrium price, did not hold. This was because impediments to 
competition, information asymmetries, long agency chains and unclear property rights were so 
widespread that using highly distorted market signals for long-term decision-making was not 
compatible with an improvement in the reallocation of resources. The financial intermediation 
through banks and capital markets did not manage to allocate a vast proportion of savings to 
meaningful investment projects. In some countries 30-40% of bank credits became bad debts 
because of the moral hazard.  
The argument here is not that markets would not be able to generate information for the 
optimal allocation of resources, but that this process is not guaranteed. Under some circumstances 
markets become vulnerable and unreliable: their resultant information may be biased, or too costly 
to get, or the chain of decision-making agencies is too long an thus is unable to act properly. As was 
pointed out by Olson (2000), many modern markets are not self-enforcing and a large part of 
production and exchanges cannot be self-protected. It was somehow forgotten that the functioning 
markets were subject to long-lasting evolution and that markets could not be declared simply by a 
decree. Even though markets are everywhere, not all market economies are rich. Thriving advanced 
market economies require socially-contrived markets, production guarded by property rights and 
certain mechanism of governance. The role of State, governments and other institutions assisting 
markets in their functioning are crucial guarantees of economic prosperity.  
Modern economies also require the availability of public goods, the provision of which by 
markets alone is either insufficient or none. It depends on some public authorities (e.g. on the 
government or NGOs) that the supply is provided at a higher level. Some public goods are actually 
public “bads” (such as pollution, crime or corrupt bureaucrats), which are over-supplied without 
proper regulation, and the society should shield itself against their destructive impacts. Economic 
transition has revealed that fields where public goods and externalities require intervention by 
visible hands of some authorities or by some institutional socially-contrived mechanism are much 
more numerous than was assumed by relying on experience from functioning liberal market 
economies. Their “natural” authorities and institutions were suddenly absent.  
The lists of problematic fields in transition countries show quite clearly that they all are 
associated with some aspect of public goods present in the following fields: information, 
environment, pollution, health of the population, medical care, hygiene, education, science, R&D, 
technical standards and norms, culture, arts, agriculture, forestry, landscape, housing, water 
resources, security of individuals, national defence, public security, regulation of monopolies, 
competition among firms, public utilities, energy networks, transport infrastructure, 
telecommunication, legislation, judiciary, care for children, youth, disabled and elderly, social 
security, stable currency, job security, property rights enforcement, public administration, public 
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procurement, bureaucracy, fiscal system and political system. In a wider sense, public goods of 
paramount importance are the markets and the human values themselves. In the former we can 
name commodity, factor and political markets, which are just information networks that can be 
easily distorted by power. In the field of human values there are ethics, justice, charity, 
benevolence, cognisance of social coexistence and human dignity, social equality, solidarity and 
tolerance of cultural, racial or religious differences. Their negative form (as public “bads”) is also 
crucial in shaping the economic co-existence: violence, malevolence, terrorism, etc. Their 
elimination can be neither left on markets alone.  
At this moment we can conclude that the collapse of communist regimes and of their 
system of social governance based on hierarchies and non-democratic authorities was based 
primarily on a sudden outburst of public choice. It was because of these countries’ inability to 
comply with some highly demanded “post-modernist” human values, such as the provision of 
consumer goods, leisure, innovation, private initiative and democracy. In a search for the common 
denominator, we may say that it was the systemic inability of the communist system to support 
individualism as a value, or if reverted, to receive a public approval of an idea that collective 
subordination to the authorities and posthumous reward are the true reasons for life.  
The collapse of communist totalitarian regimes did not mean at all that it implied also a 
demise of hierarchies as instruments of human organisation and cooperation. Just the opposite: 
experiments with the dismantling of hierarchies and reliance on the monism of markets revealed the 
frail nature of markets and their failures, once the required properties of private goods and the 
relevant institutional support for them were not present.  
Having that in mind, one can put forward another crucial question: once the combination of 
hierarchies and markets (i.e. the mixed economy, as it was called by P. Samuelson, 1968) can be 
complements, how can we separate from it that part of their relationship that is causing rivalry and 
substitution between them? Here we should return back to the nature of public and private goods 
and their interpretation under capitalism and communism.  
The subordination of the whole economy to a hierarchic command would be objectively 
legitimate only in a system where: 
  • all goods are public goods (preferably with absolute externalities);  • the central authority (due to perfect information) is able to rank all alternatives.  
 
That would be a case ideally inverse to the “selfish world” of Adam Smith. In a perfect command 
economy individuals cannot have any autonomous subjectivity for both making “private” decisions 
and accumulating private property. Thus the optimal economic ordering in this metaphysical world 
could be enforced exclusively by Providence as the final authority exogenous to the world of egos. 
For a suboptimal, but still uniquely ordered social choice function Providence is replaced by a 
dictator – exactly how it was proven by Arrow in his “impossibility theorem”. Because there is an 
objective need for creating an absolute subjective authority in any system of central command, 
reaching of the point M’, that is the only system’s maximum, is thus a completely subjective 
declaration. It is just a myth. Since there may be a conflict between the dictator’s optimum and the 
viability of the society, even the most radical central commanders are again forced to split the 
economy into a dual system – leaving the allocation of private goods to the competing bidding of 
simulated markets while the provision of (alleged) public goods would be administered by public 
governance. 
Chinese more recent reform of the market socialism is an advanced liberal form of a dual 
command system. The amendment of the Constitution in 1999, where the original statement that 
“private sector is complementary to the public sector” was changed to “… private sector is an 
important component of the national economy”, was its most logical step. Economic sustainability 
of the new Chinese non-public sector required privatisation at a much larger scale than just at the 
level of family businesses, what no other communist system realised before them. The 
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Scandinavian system of a large public sector was a similar move towards a “balanced” dual system, 
but coming from the market side. Calling the highly mixed dual systems “a third way” therefore 
hinges on highly subjective treatment of the borderline between private and public goods and on 
institutional constraints of levied on the performance of markets. Although such arrangements can 
be socially (or politically) preferred, the solution of trade-offs between private and public goods is 
hardly compatible with criteria for Pareto-optimality. 
The progress of reforms in the European centrally planned economies was impeded by the 
hierarchy monopolised by the Communist Party. Its relinquishing would mean an acceptance of a 
parallel centres of power coming from the private sector, what means a creation of an implicit 
multi-party system, the spillovers of which into the public choices could not be suppressed. Once 
the “orthodox communists” would lose control over the rise of the new private sector, the transition 
to an economy dominated by markets and the loss of their political monopoly would be 
unavoidable.  
Nevertheless, the dualisation of the communist economy was slowly progressing since 
1953. The network in the pyramid of “formal” commands was ever deeper undermined by  
“informal” links. While the former were associated with the official structures of enterprises, state 
institutions and the Party itself, the latter were formed by “stakeholders” that informally 
“privatised” the decision-making and production. This was a similar problem known for long from 
dual (mixed) market economies where principals (owners) became dominated by their agents (e.g. 
managers and bureaucrats). The informal sector of stakeholders in the command system gradually 
spread like an inverse pyramid parallel to the formal hierarchy (Mlcoch, 1995). Its problem was that 
it could not rely on undistorted markets, the prices were distorted and the build-up of private 
ownership was impeded by a rule that personal appropriation of profits was illegal. The resulting 
schizophrenia and hypocrisy became so intensive that the whole social arrangement earned a 
nickname of “Absurdistan”. The official hierarchies were so deeply undermined by informal links 
that in late 1980s the whole European communist empire depended just on the alert of the Soviet 
Army’s high command. 
 Except for the link to official hierarchies, the informal society in communist countries had 
another link – that to enterprises, production and trading. This was the shadow economy that 
became ubiquitous and whose functioning was based on markets. It was spread from large state 
enterprises (which were able to convert state commodities to private commodities for corrupting the 
planners and bribing the employees) down to families, which were engaged in a myriad of barters 
and domestic production. Except for that, there was present a booming sector of informal networks 
active in sports, hobbies, travels, culture, science and R&D. This informal sector developed 
spontaneously and its decentralised autonomy, based on an organisation similar to the internet’s 
web, made it resistant to the police state. Its weakness was in a lack of leadership and central 
coordination. It was only in Poland where the informal structures succeeded to form a foothold by 
establishing Solidarity as their own parallel hierarchy. 
 
4. The Untenability of One-Pillar Social Systems: From Market to Market 
 
Why cannot even countries with an advanced market system adopt it as a single factor dominating 
politics and social governance? The markets imply a myriad of conflicts among economic agents. 
Their organised pressure or defence against them implies politics. Big players in this game 
(corporations, unions, governments, states) mean big politics. But there is a paradox here: the 
objective reason for an active economic role of the government comes from the existence of public 
goods and not from the politics as the rent-seeking opportunistic actions of pressure groups.  
There are most diverse conjectures about the dividing line between public goods and 
private goods, where neoliberals and conservatives stand adamant for a minimal definition, while 
the traditional left wing would preferably include all products among the public goods. Let us start 
with less controversial items. According to Olson (2000, p. 196), the first preoccupation of any 
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economies is the property rights protection. If a society agrees on directing its preferences on 
prosperity as a function of production, investment and trading, then the most important incentive for 
achieving that rests in protecting private property: “there is no private property without 
government”. Closely related to that is the protection against predation – be it autocrats, mafia, 
monopolies, cartels, re-distributional lobbyism, free riders or malevolency, ranging from slanders to 
terrorism. The government is thus an identity with legislation, judiciary, police and defence – all of 
which guarantee the minimalist set of public goods, as defined by A. Smith. 
 All what is above this narrow definition of public goods is controversial, at least in the 
economic sense. If markets are not perfect, and if private goods are not exclusive objects forming 
GDP, then markets are sub-optimal. It then follows that alternative institutions, more appropriate to 
the nature of the problem, should be activated. It is not an accident that economics in the last 40 
years have been gradually shifting its attention from technicalities behind the optimal allocation of 
given private resources to inter-human relationships and their institutions, which may result in 
economic behaviour full of conflicts, locks-in and disequilibria.  
Some of the most important advances in economics in the last 20 years were dealing with 
transaction costs, externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard, free riding, rent-seeking, 
incomplete contracts, adverse selection, signalling, uncertainty, incomplete or missing markets, 
altruism, oligopolies, re-distributive coalitions, increasing returns to scale, public choice, law, 
ethics, endogenous growth, environment, inequity and human capital. All these challenge the 
markets as universal instruments of economic organisation and governance, and call for an 
additional pillar supporting these changes. The governance over the public goods looks now wider 
than ever before – becoming the dominant economic problem in modern societies. 
In the past the answer was simple: it should be the State represented by the Government (as 
the top hierarchy) who should become the second pillar (parallel to markets) in such a world. The 
problem was whether the government should retain the strategic surveillance and indicative 
coordination over the public goods provision only, or whether it should also become an agent 
producing these services.  Is this dualistic co-existence of private and public sector the final word? 
We should look again at the history in order to unveil the dynamics of change. 
 Since the time of physiocrats economics was obsessed by material production – first by 
agriculture and later by manufacturing, which dominated the economics of production until the end 
of 1970s. The number of products was small at the beginning and their technologies evolved also 
from a very narrow base. However, the innovation cycles were accelerating and the product 
differentiation was increasing exponentially. The number of varieties competing for the consumers 
was increasing as the trade was becoming more liberalised and globalised (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
1997, p. 127-141). According to Engel’s law, the weight of food and material products on GDP was 
steadily declining. The importance of human activities in services required that the concept of GDP 
had to be redefined several times since 1950s and more services were allowed to be included. Now 
in some countries merely 2% of employed workers are enough to provide for self-sufficiency in 
agriculture and 25% in manufacturing. The remaining more than 70% of employees work in 
services. Services became objects, which were difficult to deal with in standard economics. The 
majority of them were “invisible”, like banking, insurance, communications, education, 
consultancy, health or entertainment. The aspects of non-excludability, parallel consumption, 
externalities and scale economies were present in too many of them.  
For long, there was a tendency in economics to ignore their existence. Economists were 
accustomed to treat markets as a pure global entity (e.g. represented by the law of one world price), 
incorruptible by acts of individuals (as the basic economic agents, in difference to colluded cartels 
as dominant players) and not fragmentised to autonomous localities and differentiated products. If 
the real markets were found imperfect, than usually only the large firms (industrial corporations, 
multinationals and their cartels) were blamed. The role of institutions, inter-human linkages, 
traditions, trust, institutions, ethics and norms were taken as counter-productive “noise” from which 
the pure general equilibrium models should abstract. In that case the sociologists and politologists, 
 13
who based their approach on empirics of political economy, were more successful in dealing with 
this essential phenomena than economists.  
The role and problems of small and medium-sized enterprises, which produce more than 
half of GDP (even in the majority of highly developed countries), and whose role has been 
increasing with the information technologies, was for long disregarded by the “high” economic 
theory. Similarly the peculiarities of housing, pensions and leisure – most probably three biggest 
single attractors of national expenditure – remained at the margin of attention. The performance of 
contemporary economies depends largely on the organisation of its similar “shadow” segments: on 
the way how various mixed (impure) public goods are governed in the interplay between markets 
and social intervention. Modern theories of endogenous growth are a part of that story.  
The existence of public goods and the autonomy of politics outside of economics – these 
are main reasons why the market system could not become a single pillar dominating the social 
organisation and governance. Similarly, no system of command alone could take over such an 
exclusive role in modern societies based on performance. However, once we grant the public goods 
an important place in modern economies we also open the Pandora’s box with its mixed blessings.  
The parallel co-existence of markets and hierarchies in capitalism became its permanent 
systemic feature ever since the feudal system exhausted its potential. Unfortunately, the problem of 
co-existence is further complicated since it is not just a mere decision about their “optimal mixture” 
(set, for example, by alternative levels of taxation), what directs the pace of social development. 
Crucial problems of public good is the problem of allocation of national resources: how to measure 
the net benefits of public projects or the social costs of government regulations, how to organise the 
public governance without the risks of moral hazard, and how to avoid crowding-out and waste of 
resources that are not under the governance of governments. 
 
5. The Structure of Two-Pillar Systems 
 
The structure of two-pillar social systems differs substantially between the command and the 
market economies because the position of their economic agents is substantially different. It is 
dependent on the way how the governance elite is recruited, how their objectives are set, which 
algorithm of the decision-making is used and what policy instruments are selected. At the same 
time the nature of control mechanism in the dominant pillar spills over into the functioning of the 
other pillar. The command economies are thus dominated by insider high politics and the crushing 
spillovers from politics (in form of power interventions) into market-like competing negotiations 
are then unavoidable.  
The spillovers from economic markets of capitalist countries into the hierarchy of the 
government are most visible in the creation of political markets based on representative democracy. 
Considered strictly from the point of view of economic markets, the political markets are often 
highly imperfect – what actually is their strength. In the majority of functioning democracies there 
is a political market based on a party duopoly with some fringe competitors. The core of such 
traditional politics was based on the right-wing/left-wing taxation alternatives, implying alternative 
sizes of the welfare state policies: how generous the pension system should be, what will be the 
growth rate of subsidies to health-care, education, defence or public administration.  
Another problem with representative democracy is that political markets are opened just 
once in 3-7 years for a couple of weeks around the time of elections. After that there is usually not 
much space left for challenging the positions gained by means of public surveillance (i.e. by checks 
and balances). This type of politics lost a great deal of public appeal in the last 30 years and we can 
speak about the present crisis of representative democracy.
6
 
                                                 
6
 According to Eurobarometer no. 59, 2003, (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/), only 
42% of EU citizens trusts the local parliaments and 37% trusts the national governments. At the 
same time the national political parties in the EU received a 75% vote of non-confidence, while the 
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The two-pillar socio-economic systems are therefore bi-polar, as depicted in Figure 3, 
where there is a tendency to dominance by one of the poles (pillars). The pillars may be represented 
by “money” and “authority” – as the driving forces in the liberal and the totalitarian models. Each 
pure model has its specific mechanisms of organisation, governance, objectives and inducement 
mechanism, enlisted also in the figure. As we explained it above, the pure models cannot exist in 
reality and there is some degree of complementarity. Therefore we can also speak about a balanced 
(“Scandinavian”) model where there is a tendency to countervail the power between pillars. 
Actually it is a balance between the sizes of private and public sectors, and the pillars “specialise” 
in the control of them.  
 
 
Figure 3: Traditional bi-polar orientation of politics and their instruments of governance 
 
It should be noted that the extreme (Hobbesian) interpretation of these two pillars is by 
taking them as competing substitutes of a zero-sum game and not complements. Granting more 
weight to one of them means stripping the other of its influence, as was shown in Figure 2. Actually 
Figure 2 represents an extreme polarised concept of a two-pillar society where the envelope of 
performance between two poles is deeply convex and narrow. It could be admitted that such model 
fitted best the period of emerging industrial capitalism and the militant stages of communist 
industrialization.  
According to the traditional theory of growth, development is a function of capital (the 
main factor constraint) and the availability of labour and natural resources. Technical change was 
considered completely exogenous with a status of a constant (the so-called Solow residual). In the 
neoliberal case, the State should protect property rights only by means of police, judiciary or army. 
For that, the Government could levy some taxes (10-20% of GDP) and thus finance its services of 
collective agencies. Additional activities of the government are supposed to be counter-productive 
(Buchanan, 2002). In centrally planned economies, the accumulation of capital was monopolized by 
the State, as was also the command over the labour force. Thus any involvement of the market in 
the bureaucratic decision-making was an alien anti-systemic element. The efficiency of the central 
command eroded quickly when its prolonged war economy had to be transformed into a more civil 
governance (Kornai, 1980). 
                                                                                                                                                    
confidence was confirmed by merely 16% of respondents. As was observed by Giddens (1998), it 
was the government hierarchy and its bureaucracy that dominated the governance strategies by 
building the welfare state, instead of promoting the welfare society. 
 Money               Authority 
 
Independent firms    State 
Market        Hierarchy 
Indirect control /”carrots”/   Direct control /“sticks”/ 
Wealth creation     Wealth redistribution 
Capital accumulation     Taxation 
Private property     Public property 
Competition      Regulation 
Free trade   Forced “exchange” 
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The biggest paradox of the developments in the last 15 years was that both traditional 
pillars of the society were losing its credibility. The central planning lost the last residuals of 
practical appeal after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the subsequent fundamental transition in 
China. However, though gradually, also the beliefs in neoliberal market models joined the losing 
side. There were the following real developments, which became a challenge to the functioning of 
both the neoliberal and  the “mixed” economics:  
 
a) Expansion of the “weightless” service sector and declining share of material production;  
b) Increasing fuzziness between the “formal” and the “informal” (shadow) economies; 
c) Growing importance of increasing returns to scale and product differentiation; 
d) Cartels and monopolistic competition raising the market transaction costs for the outsiders; 
e) Globalisation of the world economy and the rise of multinational corporations; 
f) Chains of governance in the corporate sector becoming longer, leading up to a separation 
between ownership and control;  
g) New styles of management required by technological break-through and globalisation; 
h) Dramatic changes in the IT technologies; 
i) Increasing role of human capital as the main constraint of growth and the rise of the knowledge 
economy; 
j) Weakening of physical capital and natural resources as production factor constraints; 
k) Rising demand for public goods accompanied by sharply rising rates of taxation and 
bureaucracy; 
l) Environmental pollution, crime and terrorism (as “public bads”), countervailing the gains in 
material affluence; 
m) Importance of social networks and institutions, reflected in the theory of social capital; 
n) Rising awareness of the importance (and the scarcity) of ethics, trust and consensus in 
economic interactions; 
o) Market failures accompanied by government failures; 
p) Increasing unemployment, income inequality and social polarisation; 
q) Rise of hierarchies parallel to the national government: bureaucracy, police, army, mafia, 
business oligarchy, religious or environmental fundamentalism, international organisations); 
r) Individualization of the society; 
s) Declining trust in politics, governments and democracy in capitalist countries since late 1960s.  
 
As a result, the worlds of “money” and “authority” were losing on their polarity, becoming 
co-integrated more closely. Not only that the intra-enterprise hierarchies grew in their size and 
influence on decision-making as the globalisation progressed, they became interlocked with the 
parallel hierarchies of the states. The most striking evidence is provided by the rise of transnational 
corporations. According to UNCTAD, 2002, p. 14, there are now in the world 65,000 such firms 
with nearly 1 million subsidiaries that produce 10% of world GDP and 30% of world exports. Their 
internal mechanism of governance is based on the existence market imperfections, globalised rent-
seeking and co-ordination by hierarchical commands (Dunning, 1993). The value added produced 
by some multinationals (Exxon, GM, Mitsubishi, Volkswagen) is often higher than the GDP of less 
developed middle-sized countries (Grauwe, Camerman, 2002, p. 6). Thus the systemic disjunction 
between markets and governments became smaller and the interdependence between them grew in 
intensity. The explanatory power of bi-polar graphs like that we depicted in Figure 2, has been 
becoming ever fuzzier to interpret (Marcusen, 1995, Arndt, Kierzkowski, 2001).  
In contrast to the big organised players in the economic and social fields, the role of 
individuals in influencing their own “governance” declined. The obsession with consumerism (i.e. 
with the one-way flow of external provisions) on one hand, combined with growing uncertainties in 
employment on the other hand, made the people highly dependent on enterprises and governments. 
It led to a paradox as if without these two pillars the people (originally conceived as the sovereigns 
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of the capitalist/democratic society) had no reason for existence. What are the limits of impotence 
of individuals? Has the authenticity of their unique existence become superseded by the more 
efficient virtual world of organisations and markets? 
In many aspects the marginalisation of individuals in the modern societies seems very deep. 
The approach to politics by representative democracy undermined its pro-active orientation that 
would require visions, prevention of future defaults and offering the people more space for their 
own initiative. Thus modern representative democracy turned to treating the effects and not the 
(expanding) causes of social conflicts. The people were turned into objects and were deprived the 
status of being subjects of policies. Thus the people in the traditional model of politics are subject to 
subordination from three domains: they “belong” to the hierarchy of some firm (as employees 
commanded by entrepreneurs), to the hierarchy of some State (as citizens commanded by 
authorities) and also to the motivation system of the markets. In accordance to such logic, it seems 
as if the development of the world depended just on the collusion between the commanders of (big) 
enterprises and the top officials of the State. Our argument is that the rule of “money” and the 
institutionalised power of “authority” are far from being closed. 
 
6. The Missing Third Pillar for Stability 
 
The result of our search is that a prolonged existence of theoretical systems based purely on markets 
or on hierarchies is refuted by reality. No such pure systems have ever existed in history. Money 
and authority do not control all human creativity. Attempts for their artificial introduction by 
“human engineering” were stricken by inefficiency and non-viability by natural selection. They are 
unable to address the real social demands at the grass-roots level. Their concepts are thus limited 
either to a mere ideological manipulation or to pure model thinking aimed at some abstract 
descriptive benchmarking. Thus the labels of “market economies” or “planned economies” implied 
neither that the real systems are based on a mono-pillar system of governance nor that they 
naturally converge to either of them.  
The conclusion of Figure 2 was that the pillars of markets and hierarchies must act in 
parallel in order to explain the functioning of real economies. It was also stressed that the structure 
of markets and hierarchies in societies are not able to determine the level of GDP by means of a 
deterministic function. We had to use the concept of an envelope in order to extract the general 
features, what also revealed the degree of indeterminacy and the spread of efficiency outcomes. The 
use of a random term (in order to describe the extent of indeterminacy of the function) is only a 
spurious approximation. The correct approach is by adding a third pillar representing additional 
factors that actually act behind the seeming variations and “uncertainty”.  
This problem has certain parallel in economic literature. For example, in the traditional 
growth theory the GDP growth is explained by production function of capital and labour where the 
state of markets and hierarchies is assumed fixed and the technical change is fully exogenous. As a 
first empirical warning, the direct estimation of production functions from time series of factors is 
often plagued by autocorrelation of residuals and the coefficient of determination is low. That 
indicates that the model may not have been properly specified and some important factors have 
been omitted. But the problem remains even if we disregard the problems with random terms. The 
interpretation of such production functions depends on a constant that is called “total factor 
productivity” (or Solow residual). It includes all non-random processes that cannot be explained by 
specified input factors. This presumed constant explains 50-90% of all growth in modern 
economies. The “autonomous” growth need not be explained by a mere technical change in 
organization or R&D alone. It may be as much the role of morals or informal inter-human 
cooperation. The theory of endogenous growth (Aghion, Howitt, 1998)) offers a large list of 
additional factors that point to tacitly excluded list of relevant variables.  
In Figure 2 the reality depicted by black line MM’ is a very complicated relationship 
between economic performance and organization, full of reversals in slopes and discontinuities. Its 
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explanatory power had to be wrapped into a shaded envelope in order to explain the smoothed-out 
trends. The width of the envelope thus suggests how important the third factor could be, not 
included in the original two-pillar world. In highly stabilized conservative societies it may be very 
thin, but in societies subjected to shocks of social reversals it may become the decisive explanatory 
factor for a suddenly improved or collapsed performance. The study of post-communist transition 
economies is a prime object of such studies. 
The logical outcome in a quest for our missing third pillar of social governance is to 
concentrate on individuals as autonomous economic and social agents. It can be represented 
by citizens organized in families, households, clubs and other types of micro-communities, 
looking at the world from their down-to-earth position. Actually this is the archetype of any 
human interaction and its objective function is of paramount importance: the human survival as 
both a biological and a social entity.  
It commences with the Darwinian aim for survival of the fittest and extends to the aim of 
the preservation of species. The social outcome of it is a co-operative behaviour at the grassroots of 
social organization based on the principles of trust, morals, solidarity, altruism, long-run individual 
stability, consensus building, satisficing barter and “reasonable” reciprocity. This system of 
exchanges and cooperation is based neither on the principles of money nor on the principles of 
authoritative hierarchies, although its interaction with both is evident. Economic literature that 
points to that interface can be found in Simon (1947), Sen (1987), Meade (1989), Buchanan (1994) 
and Rowls (2001), among many others. According to them, the nature of modern economics 
downgraded when its link to individuals was limited just to an abstract homo economicus. Also, the 
growing distance between the world of colluded markets and hierarchies on one hand and the 
solitary individuals on the other hand, resulted in further crowding-out of people from their role 
sovereign economic decision-making agents. The role of individuals in such economic systems 
degrades once their “usefulness” is defined only in their (usually subordinate) relationship to capital 
or to hierarchies of power. The integrity of such systems becomes distorted. For example, the 
development is limited to GDP growth and the value of individuals is measured by their disposable 
income only. The remaining human activities are not interpreted as a wealth creation.  
Once the number of social pillars is extended to three, so that markets and hierarchies are 
complemented with the civil sector as the third pillar, we arrive at a concept that is more compatible 
with reality. The third pillar represents individuals (“egos”) and their authentic relationships 
exchanges. Actually this brings economics as a science closer to its Greek original concept 
conceived as “oikos nemein” – i.e. teaching about household management.  
Such three-pronged systems cover all three levels of organization and exchanges: micro (at 
the grassroots of families or citizens), mezzo (at enterprises) and macro (at the national level). It is 
also evident that the interests at these three levels can be disjunctive and autonomous, even though 
in principle it was individuals who agreed to have both markets and governments as their 
instruments caring for their well-being. Another parallel can be raised with the democratic ideals of 
French revolution: liberté - égalité – fraternité, which can be interpreted to involve liberal markets, 
equality of people in hierarchies and brotherhood of individuals. 
7
 
The crucial question in the three-pillar system is how the authentic interests of individuals 
are revealed through markets or through the representative democracy. As to the latter, it was 
revealed by the public choice theory and by the practice of communist “democracy” that this 
transmission may fail and a bureaucratic or an autocratic degeneration of such systems is a real 
threat. The situation is also complicated with the pure market “voting” and the equilibrium of 
individuals. Competitive market equilibrium solution is definitely the most efficient one, as far as 
the given endowment of labour input factors is concerned. Unfortunately the maximization of GDP 
                                                 
7
 As a speculative exercise in the philosophy of religion, let us mention the following interpretation 
of the Christian Trinity. With the help of some tolerant imagination Father, Son and Saint Ghost 
can be associated with the principles of hierarchy, brotherhood and market rational autonomy. 
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(and with this the maximization of individual incomes) as an objective function may be in conflict 
with our third pillar. For example, in the pure private goods world this would lead to an acceptance 
of the Darwinian (or Malthusian) selection and the reconciliation with one’s own extinction, once 
the market criteria assign the labour too low marginal product.  
It also implies resigning to the existential threat coming from the widening inequality, for 
example, when 0.1% of inhabitants receive 11.6% of all income, as Atkinson (2002) estimated for 
Britain in 1913 (while for 1974 it decreased to 1.45%). Another market threat to individuals comes 
from the condition of daily adjustments of labour and capital allocation to factor yields. That 
implies high uncertainty in employment and a need for migrating. If we extend the theory of pure 
markets to the existence of public goods and externalities then failing markets can become an 
existential threat through the emergence of environmental damage, kleptocracy and general crime. 
Even though both the State and the Market can be extremely useful servants, they are 
seldom accepted as universal masters if the revealed interests of individuals are considered. 
Although the feedback loop from individuals to markets and governments is crucial for the 
functioning of markets and governments, the society cannot end up with only that. Individuals have 
their autonomous economic objectives that cannot be measured by GDP. They are called “human 
development” (Ranis et al., 2000). They relate to attainments in freedom, health, education, 
security, equality and creativity. In addition, a large part (if not directly a dominant part) of 
individual utilities and “disutilities” is realised from sharing and exchanges inside of families, 
partnerships and localities that are neither mediated via public markets nor provided by 
governments. Nevertheless, their efficiency is largely influenced by the social set-up, public 
policies and markets.  
The three-pillar socio-economic system based on markets (m), hierarchies (h) and egos (e) 
allows altogether eight (2
3
) vectors of fundamental alternative policy strategies, of which four are 
involved in the support of the individual/civil society (see Table 1). Remaining four political 
strategies take the existence of autonomous interests of individuals for irrelevant. The “third way” 
then gets an equal footing with the policies addressing markets or governments. Now we arrived at 
a nominal criterion for testing whether some declared policies can be labelled as politics of the third 
way. For example, we can test a list of features designed for British Labour Party, as proposed by 
Giddens (1998) and compare it with politics of “old social democracy”, as is indicated in Table 2.  
 
Table 1: Classification of political systems based on three pillars 
Markets Hierarchies Egos Characteristics of the political system 
1 0 1 Liberal 
0 1 1 Syndicalist 
0 0 1 Trotskyist/anarchistic/ 
1 1 1 Balanced/renaissance/ 
1 0 0 Business fundamentalism 
0 1 0 Etatist/communist/ 
0 0 0 Nihilistic 
1 1 0 Elitist/oligarchic/ 
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Table 2: Classification of the “Old” and the “New” politics 
8
  
(according to A. Giddens, 1998) 
Old politics (“Old Social Democracy”) New politics (“New Social Democracy”) 
Welfare state Welfare society
Collectivism Individualism
“Objectivist” consumption pattern Personal choice
Critique of capitalism and markets Synergy with capitalism and markets 
Dominance of the State Dominance of the Civil society 
Keynesian support of aggregate demand Support of the supply side
Distrust to markets Markets matter
Bi-polarisation of the world Bi-polarisation is less important 
Low awareness of the environment Environment matters
Fetish of forced income equality Equality of chances and indiv. performance 
Mass material production Employment in services
Big business are crucial Small and medium-sized businesses matter 
Elitist state and public administration Transparent state and public administration 
NGOs as partisan interventions NGOs are crucial for democracy 
National economies Cosmopolitan economy
Physical capital as the main factor Human capital as the main factor 
Material consumption Quality of life and human development 
Gvt. protection and discretionary intervention Discipline and encouragement by incentives 
Authority, traditionalism Democracy, libertarianism
Traditional family Female emancipation
“High” politics Politics for life
Exclusion by formal hierarchies Inclusion outside of hierarchies 
Science and technology elitism Science and technology openness to public 
A-priory rights of State for re-distribution No rights without duties (responsibilities) 
Rising taxes and public administration Reform of the state and public administration 
Negative public social services Positive public social services 
Centralisation Decentralisation, devolution, subsidiarity 
Bureaucracy and corruption Efficient service to the public 
One-time big elections Permanent direct democracy 
Provision of public goods by the State Mediated public procurement tenders 
Closed national state Cosmopolitan state and nation 
Economics of selfish interests Economics of communitarian coexistence 
Formal business entrepreneurship Informal social entrepreneurship 
Traditional hierarchical family Flexible family ties based on equality 
Economic certainties and re-distribution Promotion of wealth creation 
Physical asset investment Social asset investment
Business ethics are secondary Business ethics are primary
Formal (positive) law and regulation Natural law guided by moral norms 
Class society Development of the middle class 
Exogenously given inequality Justice and equality are endogenous 
Dependence on external provisions Self-support, grass-root initiative, soc. capital 
Sharing of means via the State Sharing and prevention of risks via the State 
Inflexible and generous pension fund Flexible (parametric) pension funds 
 
                                                 
8
 We leave it on the judgement of readers to see whether the proposed “new” politics correlate with 
the principles of our third pillar more than what the “old” politics does. Similarly we can test their 
dependence on state bureaucracy or pure market provisions.  
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The “old politics” of industrial capitalism (both conservative and socialist) that developed 
in late 19
th
 century are based on an explicit acceptance of a two-pillar system of social organization, 
which is dominated by a co-existence of markets and hierarchies. The basic question that an 
individual could ask is such system was: “what’s going to happen?” Features that were not a direct 
functional part of these two pure systems (e.g. morals, solidarity, informal relationships and 
individual sovereignty) were taken as exogenous residuals that were originally more-or-less 
constant in time and consensually recognized. As capitalism was reaching the limits of its welfare 
state, there was a gradual tendency to transfer these “exogenous residuals” into policy variables. 
This is clearly visible by comparing column 2 in Table 2 with column 1. The basic question of an 
individual now changed to more active: “what can I do?” 
We can therefore extend the philosophy of Figure 3 by adding a third fundamental pillar. 
Table 3 provides a review of principles that characterise the differences in functioning of our three 
pillars of social governance. We can see that each of the pillars is based on a set of specific 
principles (objectives and instruments), which allow them to perform specific tasks that an 
alternative pillar does not cover at all or it is covered only partially. The “logics” or the form of 
rationalisation of individual pillars are sufficiently different for granting them status of existential 
autonomy. Therefore the question of substitution, complementarity, specialisation and exclusivity 
in the functioning of pillars is a crucial problem challenging all alternative structural compositions 
of social governance.  
Since the ways how the society may influence the governance of pillars are rather limited 
and subject to institutional inertia, the evolution of social systems is not only slow but also highly 
autocorrelated. Features of path dependency and embededness may therefore interfere with attempts 
of applying rationality to such designs of human engineering. Politics is a common field for the 
social governance of pillars. Table 3 shows how complicated its objectives must be and many 
vested interests act against finding a social consensus.  
 
Table 3: Characteristics of social governance in post-industrial societies 
 Pillar I. Pillar II. Pillar III. 
Agents: Firms, businesses State, government Individuals, citizens 
Channels of 
interaction: 
Markets Hierarchies Informal kinships 
Objective of agents: Profits, money Power rents of 
discretion 
Secure, pleasant and 
enduring life (felicity) 
Instruments of power: Money, capital Coercive administra- 
tive institutions 
Human and social capital, 
civil society network  
Media inducing 
social adjustment : 
Price Regulation, decrees Culture, moral code,  
natural law 
Media of governance 
(of the pillar): 
Competition, 
econ. policy 
Political democracy, 
constitution 
Consensus, ethics,  
meta-culture 
Origin of gains: Wealth creation, 
profits 
Wealth redistribution, 
rents 
Externalities of justice, 
solidarity and altruism 
Sources of growth: Capital 
accumulation 
Taxation capture Education, social wisdom, 
cooperation, loyalty 
Relationship to  
property: 
Private property Public property Property sharing, voluntary 
inter-dependence 
Nature of exchanges: Free trade  Non-equivalent,  
(enforced) transfers 
Satisficing barter,  
(“reasonable” reciprocity) 
 
Capitalism of free markets was based on an institutional and ideological support of pillar I, 
while communist “real socialism” did the same with pillar II. Traditional social democracy relied 
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on the combination of both. The key players in traditional political games in industrially advanced 
countries during 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries were organised in businesses and in governments. Their real 
power came from the wealth creation and taxation. The bureaucratic hierarchy of the State is 
represented at its summit by the Government that exercises its monopoly of coercive power down 
to businesses and individuals by means of police, army, legislation and judiciary.  
In the ideal case, industrial capitalism could have existed nearly exclusively on the 
principles of the market alone. However, some exceptions were required since predation was (is and 
will be) a human feature as natural as production. Markets cannot function without enforcement of 
property rights and a defence against external invasion. That would require the existence of the 
Minimal State – thus the introduction of a parallel second pillar to our table was inevitable. So we 
can see that the State is defined as an unavoidable complement and not as a competing substitute to 
markets even in the archetype of the neoliberal capitalist system based on free trade.  
During early stages of capitalism capital was the politically dominant factor because of its 
scarcity and its high potential mobility among industries and countries. Its positive marginal yield 
regulated by competition was the dominant source to GDP growth and wealth. Any taxation above 
the requirements of minimal state was causing deadweight losses. Therefore it was the capital that 
dominated political collusions. Also the complementary human capital and social capital were 
under its natural control. Markets are natural computational entities of an unparalleled power, able 
to coordinate extremely complicated simultaneous decision-making problems of billions of agents 
and to calculate dynamic equilibria for millions of (“commodity”) allocations (Hayek, 1944, 
Mirowski, 2002), provided the markets are free and the commodities are private goods.  
According to Adam Smith, the invisible hands of markets could also function as substitutes 
for morality, social norms and the intrusion of autocrats. Thus, from an economic point of view, the 
political role of our third pillar in an industrial stage of social development could be reduced to 
minimum. The paradox of neoliberal economics is that even though its philosophy is based on 
individuals (both as consumers and as producers) defined as the only sovereign agents in its game 
of homo economicus, in reality the power of the capital over-ruled the autonomy of consumers or 
workers as decisive agents. The authentic role of individuals, morals and justice has again to be re-
discovered in the post-industrial world.  
The importance of markets in shaping social governance was on a steady decline since the 
World War I, offering more power to be taken by the State. This process is best represented by the 
growing share of public spending and taxation on GDP – the so called “state capture”. 
Unfortunately, as it was evident at least since 1970s, the visible hand of the State had also its 
constraints to becoming a satisfactory agent for replacing the markets. Government failures became 
even more omnipresent and dangerous than market failures. The most tragic situation occurred in 
the centrally planned economies. Nevertheless, the legacy of the past 20
th
 century is such that the 
growth of economies is dominated by big businesses (acting under imperfect and failing markets), 
while the global social environment is dominated by all-embracing interventions of governments 
and their bureaucracy. What is even most difficult to change is that individuals accepted this 
“exogenous” culture by voluntarily waiving their personal responsibilities and delegating the 
decision-making to hierarchies and businesses.  
The political power associated with the third pillar (described in the fourth column of Table 
3) has been on a gradual rise in recent 50 years, as the post-industrial economic development was 
gaining ground and civil society strengthened. Nevertheless, it should be said that it is still not 
dominant at the present state of economic development. The dominant playground of “people” in 
modern post-industrial societies remains in their passive role as input factors (i.e. as labour 
challenged by unemployment) and consumers (enthralled by the cult of mass commercial culture). 
But if the value of human and social capital of “labour” is growing (as is growing their marginal 
productivity), so is rising their political role in the economic sector. Its increasing role in the 
government sector is also recognized. 
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The weakness of individuals is that they are atomised and their defence against businesses 
or governments is generally by passive resistance. A clash between an individual and a big business 
or an office of the government is asymmetric. The fiction literature of such authors like Kafka, 
Hasek, Huxley or Orwell illustrates it quite persuasively. However, the evolving paradigm of post-
industrial capitalist society raised the social value of individuals as much as never before in the 
history. As is argued by Thurow (1999), the wealth in the past was associated with the ownership of 
land, natural resources, plants and equipment. The new trends in creating wealth are associated ever 
more clearly with the control of knowledge, and with the social organisation and education that 
encourage creativity and curiosity. At the same time the process of acquiring knowledge in the free 
open world is ever more biased to personal initiative than to the activities of governments or 
businesses.  
The role of the third pillar in politics was coming to prominence as the nature of industrial 
capitalism was gradually changing with the rise of service industries, economies to scale, product 
differentiation and imperfect markets. The demand for the provision of public goods, or for 
commodities having some aspect of public goods, grew much faster than the demand for private 
goods. At the same time there were growing supplies of products with negative externalities, like 
pollution, congestion or crime. On one hand, the markets were crowded out by the interventions of 
the State. But on the other hand, there rose a tendency to involve civil society more intensively in 
the social decision-making. That was also instrumental in building the theory of public choice, as an 
application of economics to the analysis of “non-market” decision-making. Actually the new ideas 
are to introduce markets, competition and/or auctioning mechanisms to fields dominated by 
hierarchies, traditions and morals. Thus the decisions in big corporations, governments, 
bureaucracies and NGOs are supposed to be more exposed to transparency and market-like 
procedures. The seminal contributions by such economists like Buchanan, Olson and Stiglitz 
opened with such arguments a new avenue in economic thought on development and economic 
organization, what was also reflected by new approaches to politics.  
The preferences for former market and etatist fundamentalism changed slowly in favour of 
the present "European approach" 
9
 to politics, economic policies and social organization. That 
system is marked by the idea of “partnership economy” based on social contracts (Meade, 1989), 
regulation of factor and some commodity markets, heavy public spending and the stress on 
solidarity and justice (Rowls, 2001). Although the parties, which gained most from applying these 
principles to their policies were the "new" Social Democrats (Giddens, 1998) or the Green parties, 
the three-dimensional approach to politics, where the dialogue between Market, State and Citizens 
is balanced, will doubtless influence also the policies on the liberal side.  
 
7. The Integration of Citizens and Civil Society into the Socio-political System 
 
By putting the individuals on the same footing with amalgamated social players, such as enterprises 
and the state, we can re-design the tripod foundations of any industrial societies in Figure 4 
(modified scheme of Pestoff, 1992, and Abrahamson, 1995).  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Taken from this point of view, Europe is a leader in many aspects of the democratic social 
integration, non-market public choice and policies of human equality, while United States are still 
standing by the traditional power politics backed by markets. The divide between them became 
revealed with politics of G. W. Bush and the additional spur it received from 11
th
 September 2001. 
See Kagan (2002) for the explanation of the policy split.  
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Figure 4:  The triangle of socio-political pillars and the forces changing the scope of their 
dominance 
 
 In this figure we see how the three exclusive sources of social organisation, governance and 
wealth divide among themselves the arena of human consensus, politics and policies. The division 
of fields is caused by such institutional (legal) classifications like distinguishing between profit 
versus non-profit organisations, between public versus private sectors and between formal and 
informal rules of acting. In the middle of the social interaction there is left a large niche of “civic 
sector”, which is subject to formal rules, with objectives that are not explicitly profit-oriented but 
that remains outside of the hierarchy of the government.  
The crucial point here is that the channels through which the three groups of social players 
coordinate their activities (i.e. markets, hierarchies and kinships) are omnipresent in the whole 
social system. Although they have its specific home domain, where heir functional principles 
originate (as depicted by a corner) and where their domination is most visible, their functional 
principle is universal and can be used in other domains. For example, markets can be used in 
allocating resources for enterprises, but also in competitions for tasks of public administration, 
political party competitions, directing NGO decisions, allocating leisure or finding a partner. 
Hierarchies are used in most varied fields of public administration, but also in running enterprises 
and families. Culture and its standards are important not only in maintaining individual social 
contacts, but also in running businesses and hierarchies (trust, loyalty, justice, etc.).  
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The position of civic sector, together with assigning more substantial role to the exchanges 
within the “informal community” of individuals, are the special objects of interest of our conception 
of the third way. While we can agree with Habermas (1987) that in the industrial societies the 
“system world” of money and bureaucracies has colonised the life of individuals, our concentration 
is to find out how the cause of individuals, families and voluntary organisations of collective 
(shared) interest is again fought back. For this we must rely on the role of culture (including ethics) 
in the functioning of societies. In its anthropological sense, culture is conceived as the reflection 
(abstraction) of all capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. In its function it 
is assigned intrinsically and exclusively to individuals. It is actually a definition of homo sapiens as 
a social and not only a biological entity. The culture assigns man two paramount social properties: 
  
a) The maxim about the right of an individual to be the own master of his/her creative entity, 
without being responsible to any higher power. This is the crucial principle of neoliberal 
approaches to society (Williams, 1996).  
b) The objective that by developing culture, man’s objective is to make the life more secure, 
rich and enduring.  
 
Both properties thus can serve as criteria for human social activities, their structures of institutions 
(such as ethics or laws) and the choice among alternatives of interaction. They also serve to 
distinguish between authentic human activities and the loss of sovereignty due to external 
manipulation or domination. In that sense, the objective function of individuals is superior to 
objective functions of enterprises or hierarchies.  
The dividing lines between sectors in the triangle of Figure 4 represent the influence 
institutional arrangements particular to given society. In the terminology of Hayek (1973) they 
reflect the status of taxis. The dividing lines can be shifted in accordance how much the society is 
more or less willing to accept the ideas of liberal economies, communist/totalitarian organisation or 
anarchism. Also the division between sectors should not be treated in a strict binary (0 or 1) logic. 
In accordance to the state of social formal versus informal organisation, it should be treated more 
like a shadow (fuzzy) interface, as is illustrated in Figure 5. There the dividing line between profit 
and non-profit sectors is not defined by the legal status but by an actual behaviour.  
The area of the social triangle allows us to depict different locations of economic agents in 
our sectors. For example, a large private enterprise A (production of car components) is dependent 
in its performance nearly exclusively on markets, both for products, capital and labour, meanwhile 
another large private firm B (provision of energy) is highly dependent on public regulation and/or 
public contracts. In contrast, public enterprise C (theatre) competes for both private contracts and 
for public competitive tenders under regulated prices.  
On the other hand, small business D (gallery and art shop) is highly dependent on the 
loyalty of local community, being on the margin between profit and non-profit (family 
employment) sector. Activity E is a self-provided repair of one’s own house, which cannot 
disregard some market signals. Activity F is the care of a family for an emotional maturity of their 
children, while in activity G the family corrects the educational failures of the public primary 
school J and in activity H a similar attempt is done by the scout organisation.  
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Figure 5: The location of agents or activities in the triangle of socio-political classification 
 
The inclusion of individuals and their informal and formal organisations into the mix of 
agents of social governance widens substantially the process of coordination. We have three basic 
instruments at our disposal (markets, hierarchies and culture) that can be exercised by three basic 
types of agents (firms, governments and individuals) in order to follow their specific objectives 
(profits, power or felicity). It is not difficult to understand that none of them has among its 
objectives a concern for a globally balanced social optimum. This could be ascribed only to God. 
We have also defined a core of the social system that rested in the civic sector and conciliated the 
alternative forces driving the society. In addition we should also consider external shocks coming 
form other societies or from the nature.  
It is only the interaction of all our players and their instruments that brings the society into 
a movement that is called “development”. Naturally, the development can be evaluated by 
historians by adjectives such as: balanced, harmonious, progressive, peaceful or constructive, 
including their antonyms. In the given moment we can only see a result of the equilibrium or 
disequilibrium of powers. There are no a-priory given “social” objectives. All is subject to interplay 
of social powers.  
A social coordination and governance subject to a wide combination of different objectives 
and instruments automatically implies a choice and a specialisation. The principles of comparative 
advantage in the usage of instruments, based on differences in endowments and productivity, come 
again to prominence. Each instrument has its own domain of efficiency, even though its usage is 
potentially universal. Social optimum can be achieved only if all instruments are in balance in their 
marginal positive effects and any potential improvement is not compensated by a decrease in 
felicity any other individual. Generally it is a well-known economic problem whose basic property 
is that it is not applicable to the real world. Nevertheless, its message is not void: it serves as a 
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benchmark for judgments why the social reality moves only within the range of suboptimality of 
most varied degrees.  
 
8. The Distortions and Alternatives to Social Governance 
 
The fuzzy approach to dividing lines is most useful in explaining one of the most important reasons 
why the communist system was finally dissolved and why, contrary to all historical experience, its 
demise was so peaceful. As we discussed it at the end of chapter 3, the cause was in the diffusion of 
power from the informal sector. The system of central command tried to control even those areas, 
which normally belong to private informal sector, private business activities or to the civic sector. 
That obviously resulted in enormous formal constraints to development, smothering the initiative 
and the willingness to cooperate. But, as Baumol (1990) explained, entrepreneurship is a firm part 
of human nature and it is virtually impossible to smother it completely. Once it is not possible to 
practice it in the formal business sector or in the official hierarchy of public administration – it finds 
its ways into the informal sector. If the constraints were too high also in the black economy, 
entrepreneurship found its most favourable space in the informal world of inter-personal networks. 
It was not only in the ways how to spend nice holidays or how to organise sports, but also how to 
extend the personal networks to enterprises, public administration and even to the communist party.  
This process of informal “subversion” of formal hierarchies by informal social networks is 
depicted in Figure 6. The communist formal structure, that looked monolithic and unscathed to an 
outside observer, was actually deeply eroded, holding together only by the opportunistic informal 
collaboration within its myriad of social networks. This opportunism was often parasitic and 
counteractive to the objectives of the central command, even though there were some exceptions 
(such as Polish Solidarity). The hierarchy of principals and agents lost its pyramidal dominance and 
is some linkages it was actually reversed (Mlcoch, 1995).  
The erosion progressed even further after the intuitively correct interventions of Andropov 
and Gorbachov – offering more powers to civil society and individual initiatives. The weakness was 
fully revealed at a moment when, after a sufficiently strong external shock, hardly anyone was 
willing to stand by such corrupt formal structure. All peaceful alternatives to supporting the 
communist rule were found more promising from the individual point of view.  
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Figure 6: Erosion of the communist system: an informal opportunistic infiltration 
 
We can reverse this argument and ask a question in what position the communist command 
system would be if the formal hierarchy would be supported (and not undermined) by the informal 
backing. By using an analogy with the World War II, when the Soviet upper command received that 
nation-wide informal support, we could presume that the collapse of the communism would be 
much delayed and it would be more difficult to bring its economic and military power to such 
evident under-performance so easily. According to this logic, a coactive collusion between the state 
(that already dominates the markets) and individuals generates positive synergy sufficient to defend 
the system from a disruptive shock from outside. That would happen even though it is evident that 
its economic system must be lagging behind the market system by not using the market information 
for its allocation of resources.  
Individual initiative and cooperative behaviour are able to compensate partially for such 
losses and avoid the most striking misallocations. This could be depicted in Figure 2 by widening 
the shaded U-shaped envelope and bringing the actual performance to its upper right-hand corner. 
Although the information about shortages, stocks and other non-price signals (see Kornai, 1980) is 
more rudimentary than information contained in market prices, it still offers some rational 
guidelines for correcting the rational allocation of resources at least partially. In that sense, it was 
more the Western ideology and propaganda what overthrew the communism than the less efficient 
economic mechanism of central planning.  
Another interesting problem, concerning the ill-performing real functioning of the three-
pronged systems of social governance, is the analysis of distortions that were caused by the 
transition of former communist countries. Such changes were marked by shifts of dividing lines 
away from the corner of their origin, while the fuzziness of their actual position also increased. The 
problem is shown in Figure 6. The dramatic weakening of the legal system reflected only the 
existing social power that the informal sector gained before the demise of communism. The distrust 
of all kinds of central regulations backfired by giving carte blanche to hyper-liberalism in running 
businesses and by opening most varied schemes of formal and informal privatisation (Benacek, 
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2001). At the same time the large State was retained and the number of public servants actually 
increased 
10
.  
The existence of large developmental asymmetries in an open society is an enormous 
incentive to entrepreneurship. For example, the number of registered firms (including self-
employment) in Czechia increased from a couple of thousand in 1989 to 1,119 thousand in 1993 
and the number of registered entrepreneurs represented unparalleled 27% of total employment in 
1998. Unfortunately the structure of incentives at that time was such that the rise of new 
entrepreneurs with productive motivation was accompanied by a rise of entrepreneurship that was 
redistributive (rent-seeking in bureaucracy), speculative (tax evasion) and even destructive (banking 
and privatisation frauds) – see Benacek, 2001. It resulted in the creation of niches for the collusion 
between businesses and the government (area I.), for the rising power of mafia and the black 
economy (area II.) and for the encroachment of unfettered bureaucracy into matters that in 
traditional capitalist societies would be treated informally (area III.). The expansion of informal 
networks, businesses and bureaucracy in transition was to a large extent at the expense of the civil 
society and NGOs (areas IVa, IVb and IVc).  
The lack of contract transparency, failing markets, failing governments and failing ethics 
during early stages of transition resulted in the rise of debts, social uncertainty, inequality and 
problems with economic growth. For many agents the basic law of capitalism – that of the hard 
budget constraint – did not exist (Maskin, Xu, 2001). The power of the centralised hierarchy was 
shattered but its army of executive bureaucrats was retained together with their extensive rights in 
disposing with the public property.  
The first five to 10 years of transition were not only a unique experiment in economics 
11
, 
they were also a grand experiment in the whole social organisation and human collective behaviour. 
People with network and organisational skills and minimal capital could mastermind schemes of 
dominance that involved creative activities of generations to build. The environment of non-
enforceability of law and prevailing informality of contracts allowed the agents to (“endogenise”) 
the functioning of markets, hierarchies, institutions and even ethics. Differing by countries, regions 
or social circles, the opaque nature of s transition influenced fundamentally the social conduct in all 
of our three pillars. As is common in situations of social uncertainty and intransparency, the 
rearrangement of the social organisation was marked by adverse selection where the recruitment of 
the new elite reflected the nature of ways how to become rich quickly. 
Looking at the situation during 1991-97 from hindsight, it is generally agreed now that the 
ideas of Washington consensus 
12
 were not able to address all the functional distortions in the 
economy and they even further destabilised the social situation. The discussion about a more 
complex approach to transition that commenced in mid 90s (Stiglitz, 1994) was officially accepted 
by the World Bank only much later. Although there were experiences from Latin American and 
                                                 
10
 For example, the number of public servants in Czechia doubled during 1990-2001 and the 
number of clerks in both the central and the regional governments increased in 1998 by a quarter 
relative to the already increased number of clerks in 1993. Similar trends can be observed in all 
central European transition countries.  
11
 Let us mention that the official label branded to “transition” was “economic transition from 
centrally-planned to market economy”. It reveals how ideologically biased was the expectation of 
social changes indoctrinated a one-dimensional (macro)economic vision of the social functioning. 
For many it was presumed that, except for some technical changes in the economy, the rest of the 
society would remain untouched.  
12 Washington consensus is a set of policy measures propagated by the World Bank and IBM for the 
transition of post-communist countries. It included macroeconomic stabilisation accompanied by 
liberalisation of prices, international trade and massive privatisation. The institutional issues, such 
as the functioning of legislation, contract enforcement or property rights, were practically 
disregarded. 
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Asian countries that privatisation and economic reforms were clearly associated with improved 
governance of both the states and the enterprises, this was not so evident in European post-
communist countries. It was found that the mixture of a high degree of state capture and an 
intensive reform (such is a mass privatisation) did not improve the governance (Hellman, 
Schankerman, 2000). To the contrary, the collusion between bureaucracy, banks and enterprise 
agents decreased the quality of governance and increased the degree of state intervention and 
general corruption. 
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Figure 7: Maladies of the squeezed civic sector during transition 
 
The last problem we will discuss concerns the alternatives to the “third way” in our 
interpretation. Once the role of kinships is gaining in the socio-economic sense, because of the 
changing objective conditions in the society, it should be reflected first in the civic sector and 
transformed to political pressures. Politics are supposed to change the respective social institutions 
that mirrored the past status quo. It is only in the three-pronged system where systemic coalitions 
make sense. Giddens (1998) presumes that it is natural for the left-wing (social-democratic) parties 
only to adopt the principals of the third pillar into its system. It sounds rational if we consider the 
values of justice and equity the core of the third pillar or if the social inclusion concerns people 
without capital. Right-wing politics have much lower degrees of freedom in making these social 
“parameters” a part of the policy objectives. In their system they are generated as given outcomes.  
However, the coalition between the first and the third pillar, and an adoption of the “third 
way” by the traditional right-wing parties are easier to consolidate if some different aspects of 
IVa. 
  
 
       IVc. 
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ethics and culture are considered. For example, one of the strongest properties of markets is that 
they are intrinsically about the equivalence of exchanges. Actually all social intercourse is about 
exchanges. Thus “markets” are phenomena with much wider scope than just in the official 
economy. The problem is that such non-standard markets based on barters have still enormous 
problems with contracts. The result is a risk of unsolved inequitable exchanges. Such exchanges can 
be sustained either by consensus of parties (pillar III.) or by unilateral force (pillar II.) only. In this 
respect the interaction between markets and human consensus is a more efficient coalition then a 
coalition between the redistributive force (governments) and individuals. The former boosts the 
market productivity, while the latter offers only a counter-productive motivation, plus higher 
transaction costs due to higher political (and ethical) opposition. Therefore many contracts and 
exchanges outside of the official firm sector cannot take place if the third pillar is not active in their 
support. This is very much in line with the empathy and the encompassing interests of enlightened 
autocrats (or kleptocrats) described in Olson and Kahkonen (2000) that voluntarily waive their 
redistributive power in support of environment promoting market exchanges.  
The political parties stressing the importance of markets and peer moral sanctions can thus 
further strengthen their argument by activating the interaction between the individuals, civil society, 
ethics and markets. As was argued by Dahlman (1980), informal sanctions based on ethics can to a 
large extent substitute the managerial regulations of the hierarchies.  
Another point offering new visions to conservative parties deals with the battle about the 
family. The recent accelerating disruption of the traditional family could become one of the most 
important social shocks in human history. Pillar III thus could become not only a source of new 
positive externalities but also a source of opposite tendencies. In addition to causing economic 
slowdown, geo-political instability and undermining the legitimacy of the market system in some 
areas, it may undermine its own foundations. According to Horwitz (2002), family still remains an 
important provider of economic and felicity “production” based on economies to scale. In addition, 
it provides a fundamental mechanism for transmitting and learning of human values, ethical 
sentiments and instincts of sovereign cooperative behaviour. As such, the family fulfils an 
irreplaceable educational task that could be on a par with the whole formal system of primary 
schools. A collapse of the family system may result in a downgrading of the build-up of human 
capital, at least in widening of the gap between its endowments by owners.  
 These are the roots of the Schumpeterian capitalist entrepreneurship. Family and informal 
kinships were also basic links between the markets and the incentive to produce or to accumulate 
wealth, before the capitalist system found a more efficient link in the collusion with the pillar of 
hierarchies. Market resurrection is thus not possible without finding a solution to the collapsing 
functions of the family and the inter-human culture. Politics based on the general principles of the 
third way can be therefore adopted by conservative parties, too. The common modern political 
objectives of all parties about fostering education, social inclusion and equality could be 
differentiated in its means, stressing alternative links of the first two pillars with the third pillar. 
 
 
9. Conclusions  
 
The concept of “the new third way” in politics can be derived from objective developments 
proceeding in the maturing industrial societies (both capitalist and centrally planned) during the 
first 70 years of the 20
th
 century and their transition to post-industrial societies in the last 30 years. 
The collapse of communist command economies based on state and party hierarchies was an 
important catalyst of these fundamental changes that had an impact on the world economy, the role 
of the state, the conditions for social interactions and the position of individuals (“kinships”) in such 
dynamic world. That had an intensive impact on the selection of policies and attitudes to politics 
throughout the world.  
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The seemingly rational idea about the loosing power of hierarchies in the post-communist 
world and the victorious crowding-in of market principles into socio-economic functioning was 
soon challenged by the reality of both failing markets and failing governments. It was accompanied 
by a sharply rising pessimism about the credibility of the existing political system even in countries 
with uninterrupted democratic capitalist traditions. Such tendencies resulted in ideas about the need 
of strengthening the role of individuals, families and civil societies in coping with the challenges of 
the globalised post-industrial society.  
The most important phenomenon that strengthens the role of individuals in modern world is 
the fundamental importance of knowledge and education in economic growth and governance. The 
design of environment favourable to the functioning of education, science, research and 
development, to the development of small businesses and entrepreneurship, and the widening of 
responsibilities that could be borne by the civil society – these are the crucial topics for shaping the 
present policy-making. 
The following statements can be associated with the politics of three-pronged systems of 
social governance based on an interaction between businesses, governments and kinships: 
 
a) Markets, hierarchies and ethics compete in a grand social game for the satisfaction of varied 
and contradictory objectives of individuals.  
b) They may become complements (and not competitors) only in a state of perfect social 
equilibrium. In another words, the lower are the barriers to their competition, the less 
contradictory is the social development and the more harmonised and more efficient social 
outcome is achieved. 
c) The specialisation of three basic instruments of social governance is a necessary 
prerequisite for their efficiency, what again stresses the importance of transparency, 
democracy and minimisation of lock-ins in their interplay. 
d) The paramount role of the government rests in not-building constraints to the economic and 
political markets, the openness of social contracts (mandates) and the initiative of the 
players in the social game – that means guaranteeing the existence of built-in disciplining 
mechanisms of their conduct.  
e) Firms and governments now depend more on the devolution and subsidiarity of their 
globalised agendas, what also implies the need for more intensive inclusion of civil society 
and personal responsibility into the solution of social problems.  
f) The inclusion of the third pillar to the social functioning implies the rising role of direct 
inter-human exchanges, altruism and ethics, as well as the rising risks of malevolence. 
g) Role of GDP as a criterion of the social objective function and the position of small 
businesses, education, centralised social and health security systems, and taxation of 
productivity in the social development should be re-considered. 
h) Three-pronged approach to social governance reveals the limits of pure economics (build 
on the assumptions perfect markets and value-free principles) deemed as a hard social 
science. Its progress requires further “endogenising” of its fields of study.  
i) The politics of the third way is best known from the initiatives of the social democratic 
parties. We can find many similarities between their proposals and the principles postulated 
in this paper.  
j) The politics of “third way” need not be limited exclusively to the politics of social 
democrats if some alternative values of culture and ethics are selected. For example, instead 
of “justice and equality”, the politics can concentrate at raising the efficiency of market 
systems by involving the civil society and ethics more deeply into their performance.  
k) The support of families and informal kinships is another policy that can be compatible with 
more conservative approaches to politics. That would allow expanding the principles of 
markets into areas of exchanges that are at present in the domain of hierarchies, civil or 
informal societies.  
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l) The inclusion of citizens and civil society into the performance of markets is at least as 
important move as the inclusion of citizens and civil society into the improvement of the 
state hierarchies.  
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